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Psychological Casualties as a Source of Friction During War
and a Mediator of Coerced Peace Efforts
Abstract
The United States homeland does not enjoy sanctuary in the twenty-first century
geopolitical environment. Near-peer rivals, such as China and Russia, have capabilities that
can impact the United States homeland during a high-end war. Adversaries’ aerospace
capabilities have the potential to cause large volumes of psychological casualties among
the United States population. Psychological casualties during a high-end war could serve as
the basis for a mass call to end a war due to the altered information processing seen among
traumatized people. Such a call to end a war could result in unfavorable peace settlements.
The United States homeland must improve its ability to prevent cognitive hacking and it
must insulate its population from epistemologies unfavorable to the United States.
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Introduction
The United States faces a complex multi-domain battlespace in the twentyfirst century.1 The United States homeland is a part of that battlespace and
is subject to the spectrum of operations leveraged by adversaries. Near
peer adversaries have already penetrated the homeland with cyberattacks
and information operations in competition short of conflict or
disintegration work.2 Despite the United States’ vulnerability to methods
short of open war, adversaries may nonetheless find it advantageous to use
hard power to compel the United States to accede to certain demands.
Adversaries engaging a high-risk scenario such as this would likely seek to
maximize success by coordinating hard power with other operational
domains, ultimately converging multiple lines of effort on the cognitive
domain.
The simultaneous exploitation of hard power, cognition, and information
dissemination would dramatically increase the scale and speed with which
adversaries achieve their hostile objectives. The use of hard power would
create new cognitive vulnerabilities that adversaries may exploit in
conjunction with existing methods of influence operations. Specifically,
hard power that traumatizes populations would alter information
processing and increase tendencies toward individual self-blame. The
altered information processing would make the population vulnerable to
cognitive hacking that can change public opinion against American war
efforts and stimulate political behavior detrimental to American interests.
The United States requires public psychological resiliency efforts,
improved information literacy, improved civics education, and increased
ability to respond to catastrophic situations with psychological support.

Methodology
This article uses an interdisciplinary perspective to examine the
implications of an attack on the homeland during a high-end war. Modern
warfare does not distinguish combatant from non-combatant and
battlefield from sanctuary. The dangers of grey zone conflicts elucidate the
current threat’s pervasiveness as seen in political warfare within
population centers, cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure, and economic
maneuvering that impacts the global economy. Yet, the danger from
conventional war still exists and may serve as a backdrop against which
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grey zone and other hostilities occur. As warfare becomes one with the
fabric of a society rather than merely a force applied against it, the social
and behavioral sciences will play a more common role not only in
understanding reasons for war, but also in preventing and mitigating the
harm that occurs during war.
This article uses an intersecting lens from the social sciences, behavioral
sciences, and strategic studies to examine the problem of manipulated
mass behavior affecting wartime policy. This methodology is not new.
Scholars have joined these disciplines to study problems such as nuclear
war, genocide, high stakes diplomacy, and hostile information operations.3
These disciplines offer rich collaboration because of shared linguistic and
methodological traditions. Thus, the scenario of a homeland attack by
high-end adversaries is examined from social science, behavioral science,
and strategic studies literature.
The possibility of a high-end attack on the United States is considered
increasingly likely in the twenty-first century. The American investment in
missile defense suggests that the United States either perceives credible
threats from limited missile strikes by rogue actors or from near peer
powers.4 Experts from the Department of Defense (DoD) and independent
scholars assert that the United States does not enjoy the sanctuary it had
from attacks on the homeland brought on by its prestige as a superpower
and from the bipolar geopolitical arrangement during the Cold War.5 The
current geopolitical environment hosts powers unrestricted by Cold War
constraints seeking to challenge the United States for dominance.
Alongside increasing multi-polarity is the fact that the United States has
exposed vulnerabilities in its military, economic, and sociopolitical
domains throughout the twenty-first century that may embolden
adversaries to challenge American dominance.
The main hypothesis examined in this article is that traditional military
methods of war, in conjunction with technology and information, can
create synergistic effects harmful to American interests. Hard power
delivered through aerospace systems may cause a change in information
processing reflective of psychological trauma. The change in psychological
processing intersects with pre-existing ways of thinking embedded within
American culture and directed by information outlets. The effect may be
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adversary dominance in the cognitive battlespace resulting in mass
behavior driven by adversary influence.

No Longer a Sanctuary
Revisionist powers, such as Russia and China, seek change in the current
international balance of power.6 Strategic ambitions may propel these
actors into a high-intensity war with the United States to unseat American
dominance in certain regional spheres of influence, or to alter the global
balance of power altogether. Unlike previous hot wars, however, the
United States in the twenty-first century does not enjoy sanctuary
provided by its geography.7 Modern weapon systems can more easily
defeat geographic-based defenses and threaten the homeland.8
It is worth noting that the United States did not enjoy geographic
sanctuary against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The Soviets
possessed a range of capabilities that put the homeland in danger. A
number of Cold War agreements and the relative simplicity of a bipolar
world, however, provided a layer of security not enjoyed today. Mutually
Assured Destruction (MAD) may have helped prevent a nuclear war with
the Soviet Union, but MAD is not a centerpiece of the current geopolitical
environment.9 In fact, geopolitical competition has led to widespread
application of hostilities that fall below the threshold for open war.
Conventional strikes that fall below the threshold for nuclear war may be a
logical extension of this approach that adversaries choose in certain highrisk situations.10
The homeland’s main vulnerability to adversary hard power is from the
aerospace domain. The homeland has a large industrial base that consists
of manpower, material, and production that would fuel a major war. As
such, the American industrial capability would be a prime target for
enemies seeking to deprive American forces of material needed to win a
war. Attacks on the homeland would also target governmental institutions
and political processes with the aim of altering the conduct of a war by
influencing decision making. A major influence on wartime decision
making is the people’s will. An enemy’s attack on the homeland would
fundamentally target the will of the people with the aim of breaking it to
compel political leaders to end a war.
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Targeting a people’s will would not be surprising. Seventeenth century
English settlers targeted Native American tribes to force capitulation, and
certain Native American tribes waged total war on English settlements.11
The 1622 surprise attack on English settlers in the Tidewater area resulted
in loss of over 25 percent of the English population of Virginia and
succeeded in stemming the settlers’ expansion.12 Furthermore, General
Tecumseh Sherman purposely sought to increase the suffering of Southern
civilians to hasten the Confederacy’s surrender. Applying the lessons of the
American Civil War, American General Philip Sheridan counseled Field
Marshall Helmuth von Moltke and Chancellor Otto von Bismarck on
causing the French population such a great deal of suffering that it
demanded the government seek peace.13 In his 1921 treatise on air warfare,
Giulio Douhet envisioned that air power should specifically target
populations to achieve military-politico objectives.14 Great Britain and
Germany also targeted each other’s population during World War II
(WWII) for strategic effects derived from influencing the will to fight.
Adversaries may assume American society is intolerable of high casualties
and seek high numbers of casualties, not only on the battlefield but also in
the homeland, to alter the course of the war.15 American policy during the
Vietnam War reinforced this perception. Partly influenced by images of
American and civilian casualties, popular opinion turned against the
Vietnam War, and the public’s opinion became an important factor in the
outcome of the war.16 Military theorists have elaborated on this perceived
American weakness. Stephen Hosmer postulated that adversaries might
prolong a war to increase casualties to force the United States’ hand in
capitulation. R.D. Hooker made a similar observation and asserted that
adversaries may try to inflict high numbers of casualties early in a
campaign to turn the public against the war.17 This assumption may be
correct in certain cases but not others. Population centers faced with an
existential threat may find perseverance and cohesion in adversity. If the
American people face an existential threat, it is reasonable to assume that
they will continue to fight. This would be consistent with other groups
faced with existential crises, such as the British, Germans, Japanese, and
Russians during WWII.
An American population that faces the trauma of war but is not
existentially threatened may see no incentive to endure the hardships of
war. The lack of incentive to remain in conflict may co-occur with high
28
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incentive to leave conflict as when an adversary is successful in its highend strikes. The incentive to leave conflict may be mediated by the altered
information processing seen among traumatized people, who after
sustained high-end kinetic attacks would manifest changes in the way they
process information. Adversaries who employ influence operations
concurrent with kinetic strikes to coerce peace settlements unfavorable to
the United States may seek to exploit traumatized information processing.
Numerous examples demonstrate that hostile actors can exploit
traumatically altered information processing. Hostage victims may grow to
identify with their hostage takers and develop animus toward the
authorities. Hostage victims who exhibit this set of attitude and behavior
change experience Stockholm syndrome and engage in a set of selfdefeating behaviors that supports their captors’ aims.18 Statistical data
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) suggests that behavior
consistent with Stockholm syndrome occurs among hostages almost ten
percent of the time.19 Large groups of people are also susceptible to hostile
actors’ exploitation of traumatized information processing. The German
population after World War I (WWI) was susceptible to Nazi messages
that directed mass behavior in a new political direction.20 Radicalism in
the Islamic world also demonstrates how hostile actors can exploit
vulnerabilities and traumas among populations and move them toward a
desired outcome.21 Hostile actors’ ability to exploit traumatized
information processing may have a different speed and scale when
interfacing with high-end weaponry. In conjunction with other factors,
such as pre-existing beliefs and access to information, adversaries may
attempt to swiftly foster mass behavior change.

Seeking Capitulation Through Air War
Both Russia and China have invested in long range weapons systems
capable of striking the U.S. homeland.22 Russian military doctrine
emphasizes the utility of massive airstrikes early in a campaign to achieve
strategic objectives.23 Russian long-term procurement goals include
precision-strike and other aerospace capabilities.24 Russia possesses
submarine-based and aircraft-based cruise missiles that can strike inside
the United States.25 Russian bomber patrols demonstrate they can
aggressively fly within American airspace, and Russia is developing
hypersonic glide vehicles that can circumvent air defenses and deliver a
29
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payload well within the United States.26 China also has weapons capable of
reaching American population centers.27 China has a robust research and
development program directed at hypersonic weapons.28
The literature shows that air attacks create large numbers of psychological
casualties.29 This article defines psychological casualties as those people
whose cognitive, emotional, or social functioning is impaired because of
war. Irvin Janis studied survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic
bomb attacks and offers a compelling description of psychological
casualties.30 The victims described by Janis initially believed they were
attacked by conventional air power. Many bombing survivors described
extricating themselves from collapsed buildings and searching for others
through debris. Fires ravaged uncontrolled and there were a number of
dead, dying, and injured people. The survivors experienced a double shock
in that they first experienced the explosion and then they encountered the
human devastation. Janis noted that acute anxiety and depression were
the predominant psychological responses to the atomic blast and indicated
that the symptoms did not differ from the British and German
psychological response to severe air attacks. Civilians miles away from the
explosion reported negative psychological responses to seeing casualties
stream into their area. Janis’ description suggests that the blast victims
experienced a traumatic event and the people who received the displaced
survivors may have experienced vicarious traumatization.
Traumatized people often have a predictable change in their outlook and
the way they process information. Traumatized people often engage in
self-blame in relation to their trauma and may conclude that they own a
great deal of responsibility for the traumatic event. Adversaries may
exploit this type of trauma-induced information processing during conflict
with the United States. This psychological effect is more likely to occur
during conflict that appears to the American people as elective in nature,
unnecessary, or something not worth the cost.
Future conflicts with adversaries may occur for reasons that appear
superfluous to the American people. The South China Sea (SCS) is one of
the most contentious international security issues.31 The SCS has
abundant reserves of oil and natural gas and numerous Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZ) overlap in the region causing disputes among
countries, while inflaming nationalist tensions.32 The SCS is also an
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important Sea Line of Communication (SLOC) for commerce. Although
the SCS has great importance to the global economy, and therefore to the
United States, a war that erupts over the SCS does not constitute an
existential threat to Americans. An existential threat represents a danger
to a group’s survival.33 A war in the SCS does not seriously threaten the
United States’ existence. This type of war may be tolerable to the American
people insofar as it remains isolated to the SCS. Warfare in the twenty-first
century, however, virtually negates the possibility that the United States
would enjoy sanctuary during a large-scale war. This reality suggests that
the American homeland would experience the adversity of war, even
though the epicenter of the conflict is thousands of miles away from the
homeland.

Information Processing
This article uses information processing theory to understanding
traumatized information processing.34 According to this framework,
traumatic events lead to fear networks stored in memory and are
accessible to conscious awareness. The fear networks are broadly
generalizable and activated by approximate reminders of the traumatic
event. Reminders of the trauma evoke escape and avoidance behaviors.
People may also change their interpretation of the event to fit, or
assimilate, pre-existing beliefs about themselves and the world. Self-blame
is an example of such an attempt at assimilation and is a common
occurrence after a traumatic event.
A traumatic event is defined as witnessing actual death, threatened death,
or serious bodily injury, or personally experiencing near death or serious
bodily injury.35 A traumatic event is an individual experience, but a group
of people can experience the same event as traumatic. A group of people
near an explosion that causes death and injury will have been exposed to a
traumatic event. This experience would be considered a mass trauma. A
mass trauma is distinguished from a collective or cultural trauma, also
known as a chosen trauma.36 A cultural trauma passes across generations
a collective memory that serves as a group’s source of intense feelings. By
contrast, a mass trauma is an acute experience that evokes alterations in
individual information processing causally related to the traumatic event.
A mass trauma may become a collective trauma, but because of its acute
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nature, it has not developed a shared symbolic mental representation of
the event within the cultural group.
The psychological response to a traumatic event is not homogeneous.
People have risk factors and protective factors that make dysfunction more
or less likely. People also have different coping styles that influence
variable responses to traumatic events. Despite individual differences in
responses to trauma, traumatic events evoke a predictable range of
dysfunction within the population. For example, post-traumatic stress
disorder occurs at a predictable rate in the general population at a rate of
three and a half percent.37 The percentage increases substantially when
considering only the presence of post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms
and not the whole disorder. Empirically speaking, the net psychological
effect of a mass trauma will yield a predictable range of trauma symptoms,
even when factoring individual differences in risk factors, protective
factors, and coping styles. Indeed, some traumatic experiences are so
intense that they obliterate adaptive predispositions and traumatize all
exposed.38 Furthermore, people may experience vicarious trauma,
whereby learning about another’s traumatic experience causes traumatic
symptoms. For instance, seeing others respond fearfully to stimuli may
result in associative learning by the observer who may come to associate
the stimuli with fearful emotions.39 Even the anticipation of a catastrophic
attack can bring about significant anxiety. The 2018 false missile alert in
Hawaii showed that merely the anticipation of a high-end attack could
cause impairing anxiety to linger for days.40
The September 11, 2001 attacks showed that a deliberate military-grade
strike on the population could cause persistent debilitating psychological
symptoms in a large number of people. Rescue and recovery workers and
others present in lower Manhattan after 9/11 experienced symptoms of
PTSD at a rate of twelve percent two-to-three years after the attack.41 A
sample of adults living in Manhattan at the time of the 9/11 attacks
showed that PTSD symptoms were present in seven and a half percent of
the population one month after the attack.42 Two months after the 9/11
attacks, the entire United States reported post-traumatic stress symptoms
at a rate of seventeen percent.43 These rates are substantially higher than
the expected three and a half-percent prevalence rate of PTSD common
within a12-month period in the United States.44 For attacks that bring
forth sustained high-end destruction, the psychological effect will be
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worse. This suggests that a high-end war will greatly increase
psychological casualties. The net effect of these casualties may be, among
other things, a large number of people with altered information
processing.

Information Processing, Just World Belief, and Motivation
People commonly hold fundamental assumptions that go unquestioned.45
The fundamental assumptions people hold serve as the foundation for
their understanding of day-to-day life. These assumptions provide a sense
of order and stability for understanding the ways of the world. Basic ideas
of justice and worth, for example, are undergirded by these fundamental
assumptions. The Just World Belief is one such basic assumption. The Just
World Belief is a belief widely found across cultures that provides the
injunction of: Good things happens to good people, and bad things happen
to bad people—or you get what you deserve. This belief is pervasive among
moral codes and remains relatively unexamined throughout life despite
serving as a backdrop for information processing.
The Just World Belief is prevalent in the United States.46This belief may
contribute to illusions of safety because people may expect to be free from
malice or catastrophe as long as they act in ways approved by their moral
codes or by society. Trauma challenges this belief and people lose a sense
of safety when it is challenged.47 Research suggests that trauma alters even
some of the most deeply held beliefs about self and the world.48 Since bad
things happened, people whose Just World Belief is altered no longer have
an orderly way of interpreting the world. In a search to regain order in
understanding the world, people who experience traumatic events may
engage in reverse reasoning with the Just World Belief by concluding that
since something bad happened to them, they must be bad in some way.
This reverse reasoning among people who experience trauma often results
in self-blame to make the trauma fit their pre-existing belief structure.49
Rather than changing their understanding of the world, traumatized
people may change their self-understanding. Self-blame provides a way for
people to maintain their fundamental assumptions in the world by
blaming themselves for some act that they perceive may have contributed
to the trauma.
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Although people maintain their fundamental assumptions by blaming
themselves, their cognitive process potentially motivates new behavior.
Attribution theory posits that inferences of responsibility lead to emotions,
which then motivate behavior.50 Self-blame is an inference of
responsibility that may be perceived as internal and controllable. This may
lead to anger.51 The emotion of anger generated from inferences of
responsibility motivates self-protective or retaliatory behavior52 People
who make an inference of responsibility to a negative outcome, and
therefore experience anger, are motivated to protect themselves from
further negative outcomes and retaliate. Policy that supports the war effort
that led to the misfortune may be a target of the people’s anger. Since
policy support is seen as internal and controllable, people are able to act in
ways that change the support. This may lead, for instance, to appeals to
end hostilities.

Psychological Casualties Can Influence the Course of a War
The sustained traumatization of populations could evoke a change in
perspective about the war effort that influences an end to the war. Air
attacks from advanced high yield weapons systems will create
psychological trauma among tens or hundreds of thousands of people
exposed to the attacks. Changes in information processing may occur
because of the psychological trauma, resulting in increases in self-blame
among the traumatized population. Increases in self-blame creates a
vulnerability to cognitive hacking by the adversary.
Express or tacit approval for a war, or even Americanism itself, may
become the focus of self-blame. People who support certain policies,
administrations, or actions related to the war may infer responsibility to
themselves. This may occur in the United States because policies that
emanate from elected officials are a reflection of the individual who voted
for the officials. In an effort to maintain their fundamental assumptions
about the world, people may blame their actions, such as voting for an
administration or simply being an American, as the cause of the trauma.
The tendency toward self-blame in American culture already exists and
can be amplified with enablers such as the media. Academia promulgates
the narrative that the United States is a malignant empire.53 This narrative
promulgates views that the United States is unjust and immoral. Versions
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of this narrative effects policy and have made way into basic education.54
This narrative has deeply penetrated American society. For instance, the
interrogator of American hostages at the Iranian embassy in 1979—
Hussein Sheikh ol-eslam—studied at the University of California, Berkeley,
where he was exposed to formal education hostile to the United States.55
Psychological trauma from a perceived unnecessary foreign war may cause
traumatized Americans to gravitate to, or more firmly acknowledge antiAmerican narratives. The anti-American narrative helps assuage the
cognitive dissonance people experience after trauma. Anti-American selfblame is readily available and prevents the challenging of fundamental
assumptions about the world.
The type of education Americans are exposed to do not help them see the
necessity of American actions around the world. There is a dearth of
education in geopolitics, intelligence, or security studies in the United
States. In 2017, he fields of business, health professions, social sciences,
and history conferred the most bachelor’s degrees.56 Academic majors that
may provide greater perspective on security-related matters are relatively
sparse.
The Council on Foreign Relations declared that the state of education in
the United States has security implications.57 Young Americans cannot
identify strategically important countries on a map and the enrollment in
government and civics classes is poor. In addition to the dearth of strategic
understanding and civic awareness, young Americans also lack a firm
grasp of concepts important to global leadership such as free market
economy, democracy, and equality of opportunity. These concepts have
strategic importance as the United States in its role as world leader works
to maintain aspects of the global economy, such as freedom of navigation,
which could become the basis for a conflict. Yet, freedom of navigation and
other potential flashpoints for conflict with great powers may not make
intuitive sense. The so-called Thucydides’ Trap exemplifies the nonintuitive basis for conflict. A Thucydides’ Trap occurs when a rising power
threatens to displace a ruling power.58 The United States’ competition with
China is seen as ripe for this phenomenon to occur. This may not make
sense to an American generation unfamiliar with realist thinking or one
ready to view the United States as a bad actor.59
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The appeals to end war that are motivated by traumatized information
processing would be more vociferous than past anti-war sentiment. The
2003 Iraq War evoked anti-war sentiment and corresponding appeals to
end that war. However, traumatized information processing of large
numbers of people did not mediate those appeals. In addition, although
the anti-war sentiment was noticeable, it did not constitute a convincing
effort to end the war precipitously. The counter narrative that of Support
the Troops, was more widespread and effective.
The Vietnam War was the target of more effective anti-war efforts. Aided
by the mass media, and an Administration that failed to make the case for
war, the American public grew increasingly dissatisfied with the conflict in
Vietnam. Not many Americans were even aware of American involvement
in Vietnam in the 1950s.60 By the time of major military involvement in
Vietnam in 1964, two-thirds of Americans said they paid no attention to
the Vietnam mission. By 1966, increasing numbers of Americans
considered involvement in Vietnam a mistake but no concerted effort
existed to end the war. Even considering it a mistake, many Americans
supported escalation of the war through 1970. American opinion of the
Vietnam War went through a series of phases— innocence, rally-aroundthe-flag, escalation, and withdrawal—that culminated in the withdrawal of
troops from Vietnam.61
During WWII, a notable subset of the American public was also
unsupportive of the nation entering the European theatre. In 1940, only 35
percent of Americans believed that the nation should go to war to assist
Great Britain.62 This perception changed by April 1941, with 68 percent of
Americans believing the nation should enter the European theatre.
Psychological casualties from a high-end war may result in massive calls to
end the war all at once. The scale and temporal dimension of such dissent
would be different from past anti-war sentiments because it would include
a large number of the population appealing to the government at a single
period with no phases. A massive increase in self-blame within the
population would be subject to cognitive hacking by adversaries using the
American media.63 Messages that highlight a lack of necessity of the war
and how the adversary is a victim of American aggression would intersect
with epistemologies unfavorable to the United States widely promulgated
in educational settings.64 People with traumatized information processing
36
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who, through increases in self-blame, may view the United States’ actions
as the threat to world peace may accept the express, or implied antiAmerican narrative easily. A direction of hostility toward the government
would not be without precedent as the British population’s response to air
attacks during WWII revealed impatience and hostility toward the British
government.65 The impertinence at the U.S. government to end the war
would conceivably be greater than past calls to end wars because of the
simultaneous experience of trauma among large groups of people
increasingly ready to see the United States as the bad actor.
The United States government may be ill prepared to deal with precipitous
and widespread rejection of its policy. It may not have the luxury of phases
of dissent, where the population moves from disillusionment to outright
calls for an end to the war. Thousands or hundreds of thousands of people
may be traumatized from war, many of whom may experience self-blame
and a desire to end war irrespective of the costs to the United States’
interests. American leaders may have difficulty appealing to its citizens’
sense of patriotism or its understanding of geopolitical realities in such a
situation. The result of massive precipitous calls to end war may result in
the United States having to agree to peace settlements unfavorable to
American interests.
It must be noted that a public’s call to end war is highly desirable and a
check on a perennial human problem. What is undesirable is a public’s
manipulation leading to decisions that places the public in a
disadvantaged or harmful position. A public’s call to end war that is the
product of cognitive hacking would harm the people calling to end the war.
A coerced peace settlement would represent a loss by the United States on
the world stage. It may result in the occupation or oppression of American
allies by adversaries. It may result in loss of control over the global
economy, resulting in a range of economic hardships including an increase
in economic disparities. A loss by the United States may ultimately result
in a more illiberal world and make the homeland more vulnerable to
future acts of aggression.

Policy Recommendations
The United States must improve its basic civic education and incorporate
advanced topics into curriculum and public debate.66 For instance, college
37
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courses that examine geopolitics or security studies should be required
curriculum to cultivate an understanding of world affairs and provide at
least a basic, but ideally more advanced, understanding of these matters.
This type of education should also expose students to realist
epistemologies, which could better account for conflict that may emerge
among great powers. Realism, for example, could most clearly describe
why an aspirant power would seek conflict for hegemonic or worldwide
goals. Furthermore, improved civics education would examine other
foundational aspects of American thinking that may serve as the basis for
foreign intervention. The promotion of human rights is a cornerstone of
American foreign policy and has been associated with past conflicts.67
Civics education that examines the United States’ commitment to human
rights may better illuminate the United States’ role as world leader and
must be incorporated into all levels of education. The United States must
also improve its ability to convey its vital interests to its population.
Leaders must inform the public about those scenarios that might lead to
conflict to gain the public’s consent when those situations arise.
Considering the hazards of the twenty-first century geopolitical
environment, the United States must promote psychological resilience. A
prolific lack of psychological resilience exists within American society as
evidenced by, among other things, insults turning into mass shootings and
increasing curtailment of freedom of expression on college campuses. A
general lack of resiliency may lead to increased suffering among
traumatized populations as the United States enters a more contested
geopolitical landscape. In addition to public resiliency efforts, greater
mental health capacity, such as increased number of Public Health Corps
mental health professionals, should be ready to provide mental health care
to population centers affected by high-end war. Mental health
professionals ready to deploy around the country to support victims of war
is important for humanitarian reasons and is good in itself, but it also
prevents adversary narratives from exploiting the situation.
Future research should continue to examine ways to protect against hostile
influence operations. Information outlets may be a natural referee of
information, but the information outlets are subject to biases that may
compound the issue or make them unwitting accomplices to cognitive
hacking. For instance, social media outlets were accused of bias during the
2020 United States Presidential election for not posting news stories
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believed important to one presidential candidate.68 The United States
must have a method of vetting information or allowing appropriate
counter narratives to exist alongside information considered questionable.
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